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Abstract Policy makers and behavioural finance scholars express growing concern
that marketing practices by financial institutions exploit retail investors’ behavioural
biases. Investor protection regulation should thus address these marketing practices
and include mechanisms curbing behavioural exploitation. That raises the question
whether the marketing communications regime of the new Markets in Financial
Instruments Directive can live up to this demand. This article develops a regulatory
model that integrates behavioural finance insights into the new marketing com-
munications regime. It then determines how regulatory authorities can apply this
model when they interpret and apply specific regulatory requirements. It demon-
strates how a regulatory authority or a court can translate empirical behavioural
finance research findings into legal arguments when assessing whether marketing
practices can significantly distort a model investor’s decision-making process. The
article further establishes that the detailed requirements imposed on investment
firms by the new Markets in Financial Instruments Directive are necessary in order
to protect investors from behavioural exploitation. Finally, the article submits policy
proposals that aim to protect investors more effectively from behavioural
exploitation.
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1 Introduction
Financial service providers devote substantial resources to product marketing. These
marketing communications have to satisfy certain regulatory standards, which have
attracted only limited scholarly attention compared to rules about mandatory
disclosure. Marketing communications can roughly be defined as any information
that is used in sales and that is not mandatory disclosure.1 Article 24(3) MiFID II2
requires that marketing communications that investment firms address to their
(potential) clients must be fair, clear and not misleading. These general and
indeterminate terms are amplified in detail by Article 44 MiFID II Delegated
Regulation.3 Both provisions came into force on 3 January 2018, and they will have
a considerable impact on shaping future financial advertising.4 This is evidenced
first by the key role played by financial promotions in the UK Financial Conduct
Authority’s overall aim of delivering an efficient and effective retail market in
financial services. Two high-profile cases in 2014 leading to fines for Credit Suisse
and Yorkshire Building Society for financial promotions failures displayed this
approach.5 Second, the marketing requirements enshrined in Article 44 MiFID II
Delegated Regulation can serve as guidelines for interpreting Article 77 UCITS IV
Directive,6 which requires that marketing communications for UCITS shall be fair,
clear and not misleading and which does not empower the Commission to adopt
delegated acts.7
This article situates MiFID II’s marketing communications regime in a
behavioural finance context and aims to demonstrate how MiFID II’s advertising
provisions can be interpreted in the light of empirical research about investor
behaviour. Such an analysis has not yet been provided in the literature. The article
makes three main contributions to scholarship. First, at a theoretical level, it aims to
bridge the gap between empirical insights and normative arguments by developing a
regulatory model that integrates insights from behavioural finance into MiFID II’s
1 Cf. the wide definition of the term ‘marketing communication’ in: European Commission, Draft
commission working document on conduct of business rules, best execution, client order handling rules,
eligible counterparties, clarification of the definition of investment advice and financial instruments,
Working document ESC/23/2005—rev1, 9 September 2005, pp 3–4; Koller (2012), § 31 WpHG para. 52.
2 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in
financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (recast) [2014] OJ
L173/349 (‘MiFID II’).
3 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of 25 April 2016 supplementing Directive 2014/64/
EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational requirements and operating
conditions for investment firms and defined terms for the purposes of that Directive [2016] OJ L87/1
(‘MiFID II Delegated Regulation’).
4 The terms marketing communication and advertising/advertisement will be used as synonyms in this
article.
5 See https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/financial-conduct-authority-fines-credit-suisse-and-
yorkshire-building-society.
6 Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective
investment in transferable securities (UCITS) [2009] OJ L302/32 (‘UCITS IV Directive’).
7 In detail Brenncke (2013), pp 982–987 for Art. 27 MiFID I Implementing Directive.
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investor protection regulation. Second, it determines how this regulatory model can
be applied by regulatory authorities when interpreting and applying specific
advertising requirements in Article 24(3) MiFID II and Article 44 MiFID II
Delegated Regulation. It shows that the detailed requirements imposed on
investment firms by MiFID II’s advertising regime are necessary in order to
protect investors from behavioural exploitation. Third, it demonstrates how the
existing legal framework can be optimised in order to achieve a higher level of
investor protection informed by behavioural finance research findings.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 sets the scene by explaining why it
is necessary to analyse MiFID II’s marketing communications regime from a
behavioural finance perspective. Section 3 uses empirical findings from behavioural
finance research to answer the questions how advertising material affects investor
behaviour and whether or not this material has a distorting effect on investors’
decision-making processes. Section 4 develops a behaviourally informed regulatory
model for MiFID II’s marketing communications regime. Section 5 shows that this
model is compatible with MiFID II’s retail investor model. Section 6 then applies
this model to specific advertising requirements contained in Article 44 MiFID II
Delegated Regulation. The article demonstrates how a regulatory authority or a
court can translate empirical behavioural finance research findings into legal
arguments when assessing whether marketing practices can significantly distort a
model investor’s decision-making process. The article also submits policy proposals
based on research findings from behavioural finance that aim to protect investors
more effectively from behavioural exploitation.
2 The Need for a Behavioural Finance Analysis
A behavioural finance analysis of the regulatory standards for marketing commu-
nications is necessary for the following reasons. First, the regulation of capital
markets law is increasingly informed by behavioural economics, both at European8
and at national9 level. Second, criticism is growing that actors in the financial sector
design sales material in such a way that it exploits weaknesses in the decision-
making processes of retail investors in order to lure these investors into capital
investments (behavioural exploitation).10 There is thus growing recognition among
scholars that retail investor protection should include mechanisms against the
exploitation of investor biases by firms.11 Third, a recent EU wide study on
consumer vulnerability in the financial sector found that marketing practices are
among the most frequent causes of consumer vulnerability and proposed that
8 Minor (2012), pp 163–164; Decision Technology (2010); IFF Research and YouGov (2009).
9 For the UK see Erta et al. (2013); Adams and Smart (2017).
10 European Commission (2016), p 334; Adams and Smart (2017); Erta et al. (2013), p 6; Hawkins
(2016); Williams (2007), p 245; Yeoh (2010), p 215. See generally for firms’ product design and sales
processes European Parliament, Consumer protection aspects of financial services, IP/A/IMCO/ST/2013-
07, February 2014, p 34.
11 Armour et al. (2016), p 222; Bhargava and Loewenstein (2015), p 398.
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measures should be adopted addressing marketing practices that exploit consumers’
behavioural biases.12 Fourth, big data analytics have increased the risk of
behavioural exploitation by financial institutions and the European Supervisory
Authorities emphasise that supervisors should evaluate and mitigate such risk.13
That raises the question whether such risk can be adequately addressed through the
existing framework for investor protection. Fifth, the effectiveness of the existing
investor protection tools can be assessed with a behavioural finance analysis. Sixth,
a behavioural finance analysis is in tandem with the evolution of MiFID II’s investor
protection model from the protection of an autonomous and empowered retail
investor to the vulnerable consumer of financial services and instruments.14
3 Why Regulate Advertising by Investment Firms?
Retail investors typically do not read complex and long mandatory disclosure
documents like prospectuses before making an investment decision, but rather
consult more accessible forms of information such as factsheets, flyers and other
advertising material. That raises the question how advertising material affects
investor behaviour and whether or not such material has a distorting effect on the
decision-making process of retail investors.
This question can be investigated by using empirical findings from behavioural
finance research. Behavioural finance is the study of the influence of psychology on
the behaviour of investors and the subsequent effect on markets. It can provide
explanations for why investors make financial decisions that deviate from classical
economic models. Behavioural finance research shows that the investment decisions
of a significant number of retail investors do not correspond with the neoclassical
ideal of a rational investor and are characterised by bounded rationality. A common
observable pattern in decision-making by retail investors is that they rely on rules of
thumb (heuristics). Heuristics facilitate decision-making in a complex environ-
ment.15 Their application can,16 however, also be a source of errors (biases) and can
cause errors of judgment.17 In the following section, five18 well-documented and
well-studied heuristics and behavioural biases of retail investors are presented,
12 European Commission (2016), pp xviii–xx.
13 Joint Committee, Discussion paper on the use of big data by financial institutions, JC 2016 86,
December 2016, p 28; ESMA Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group, High-level response to JC
Discussion Paper 2016 86, 7 April 2017, pp 2–3.
14 Moloney (2012), pp 177–185, 189. Critical of this development: Mu¨lbert (2013), p 180.
15 Engel and Gigerenzer (2006), pp 2–4.
16 Heuristics do not have to be a source of biases; see Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011), pp 456–458;
Slovic et al. (2002), pp 332, 337; Tversky and Kahneman (1974), p 1130.
17 Jolls and Sunstein (2006), p 204. Decision Technology (2010) provides experimental evidence across
EU countries that retail investors are prone to biases and do not decide optimally when making
investment decisions; see also European Commission (2016), pp 196–217.
18 For a detailed description of typical biases of retail investors see Gilovich et al. (2002); Pompian
(2012). For an overview, see Helleringer (2018), Part I. The representativeness heuristic, the availability
heuristic and the anchor heuristic are the three heuristics discussed in Tversky and Kahneman (1974).
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which will later be used for the interpretation of MiFID II’s advertising regime.
Some of these heuristics and biases are closely related. These heuristics and biases
can be described as basic cognitive and emotional mechanisms that occur in
different jurisdictions and cultural settings according to a wide range of empirical
studies. Even absent EU-wide studies19 it is thus reasonable to presume that a
typical retail investor in every Member State exhibits these heuristics and biases to a
certain degree.
What is still unclear is how behavioural finance can serve as a means to improve
the legal protection of investors. For the most part, behavioural economists and
behavioural finance scholars characterise the normative standard underlying their
policy recommendations as paternalistic.20 Paternalistic measures can be ‘harder’ or
‘softer’, depending on how deeply they interfere with individual decisions. The
influential concept of ‘libertarian paternalism’,21 which is a form of soft paternalism
and includes the popular concept of nudging,22 aims to improve the welfare of
boundedly rational individuals by steering them towards more reasonable behaviour
and towards better choices while preserving their freedom of choice. We will see
later in Sect. 4 that the regulatory model developed in this article is in harmony with
libertarian paternalism.
MiFID II’s investor protection regime also enhances conduct protection for
professional investors. As opposed to its predecessor Article 27 MiFID I
Implementing Directive,23 Article 44 MiFID II Delegated Regulation refers not
only to retail but also to professional clients. The focus of this article will
nonetheless be on retail investor protection as available empirical studies on the
effects of advertisements on financial behaviour mainly concern retail investors.
3.1 Heuristics and Biases of Typical Retail Investors
3.1.1 Representativeness Bias
An abundance of empirical studies shows that a significant number of decision
makers choose financial instruments based on their historical performance.24 Retail
investors believe that past performance is representative of future performance. Past
performance data can be useful in context, but retail investors often extrapolate
19 But see European Commission (2016), p 197 (‘An important aspect of behavioural vulnerability
drivers is the fact that they are observed across all consumer groups […].’).
20 Some scholars do not support the use of behavioural finance to formulate policy recommendations. For
a summary of the criticism against behaviourally informed policy-making, see Tor (2008), pp 318–325.
21 Developed in: Sunstein and Thaler (2003).
22 Thaler and Sunstein (2009); Sunstein (2014). For a discussion of the relationship between libertarian
paternalism and nudging, see Hansen (2016).
23 Commission Directive 2006/73/EC of 10 August 2006 implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational requirements and operating conditions
for investment firms and defined terms for the purpose of that Directive [2006] OJ L241/26 (‘MiFID I
Implementing Directive’).
24 For discussion see, each referring to empirical studies, Ackert and Deaves (2009), p 143; Daniel et al.
(2002), p 145; Hu¨sser and Wirth (2013), pp 220–221.
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historical ‘trends’ into the future and over-rely on past returns information when
making investment decisions at the cost of other factors like an investment product’s
fees and risks. These investors are subject to a decision-making error as the actual
predictive validity of past performance on future performance is poor.25 Advertising
that focuses heavily on past performance data of a financial instrument appeals to
this decision-making error, confirms the error and is therefore successful.26
3.1.2 Availability Bias
The availability heuristic relates to the propensity of decision makers to rely on
readily available information to a disproportionately high extent when making a
decision.27 This is based on the error of judgment that events that are familiar and
easy to remember are more likely or more frequent to occur (availability bias).28
The availability bias particularly denotes errors in estimating probabilities. Two
factors can exacerbate the availability of information: (a) if an event or information
has occurred recently, it is easier to remember (recency bias)29; (b) it is easier to
recollect salient events or information than non-salient events or information
(salience bias).30 Salience is heavily influenced by the way information is presented.
For example, vivid and specific information is overweighted in comparison to pallid
and abstract information. Studies have shown that salient product attributes in
advertisements for financial instruments tend to become overweighted in subsequent
decisions among investors leading to decisions that deviate from traditional
economic models.31 The availability heuristic can explain why retail investors base
their investment decisions on sales material that is readily available and presented in
prominent style without entering into a deep search for information.32
3.1.3 Framing Bias
Framing bias denotes the propensity of decision makers to assess the same
information differently based on the way or the context in which it is presented
(framed).33 Framing bias is closely related to salience bias. A considerable amount
of behavioural research shows that the format in which information about risks and
benefits of a financial product is presented influences retail investors’ investment
25 Ackert and Deaves (2009), p 145; Hu¨sser and Wirth (2013), p 220; Pompian (2012), pp 90, 181.
26 See Palmiter and Taha (2011), p 15.
27 Pompian (2012), pp 155–156, 159; Sunstein (2011), p 1358; Tversky and Kahneman (1973), p 221.
28 Jolls and Sunstein (2006), pp 203–204; Tor (2008), p 248.
29 Ackert and Deaves (2009), p 97; in detail Pompian (2012), pp 179–188.
30 Ackert and Deaves (2009), p 97; Sunstein (2013), pp 1846–1847; Tversky and Kahneman (1974),
p 1127.
31 See, e.g., Cox and de Goeij (2018), p 3. For theoretical models see Mullainathan et al. (2008); Bordalo
et al. (2016).
32 In detail, Pompian (2012), pp 157, 159–160; cf. Erta et al. (2013), p 59.
33 Kahneman and Tversky (1984); Kahneman (2011), pp 363–374; Pompian (2012), pp 143–145.
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decisions.34 These empirical studies also demonstrate that framing effects can lead
to a distorted perception of the risks and the return of an investment by retail
investors, which differ from the investment’s actual risk-return profile.35
3.1.4 Anchoring Bias
The anchor heuristic describes the propensity of decision makers to make estimates
by starting from an initial value, which can be contained in information for example,
when making decisions and in particular forecasts under uncertainty.36 The decision
is biased towards the initial value as subsequent information that does not
correspond to the initial value is downplayed, underweighted or ignored.37 Studies
have shown for example that a significant number of retail investors frequently use
short-term historical performance data of an investment fund as an anchor for the
future performance of the fund. This links the anchoring bias with the represen-
tativeness bias. Using such anchors in advertising material can have a distorting
effect on how retail investors perceive the yield of a financial instrument and can
lead to significant decision-making errors.38
3.1.5 Emotional Bias
The affect heuristic refers to the influence of emotions on the behaviour of decision
makers. It states that emotions generated by non-informative stimuli influence the
perception and processing of information, the preferences of decision makers and
the decision-making process.39 Studies have shown that emotions triggered by
advertisements are capable to guide the cognitive perception of the risks and the
benefits of an investment product.40 These results correspond with theoretical and
empirical work demonstrating that persuasive but uninformative content in
advertisements is capable of affecting economic outcomes because salient non-
informative product attributes may be disproportionately weighted in subsequent
judgments.41 A decision that is guided by the affect heuristic may lead to judgment
errors (emotional bias) if the affective component of the decision-making process is
controlled and manipulated by non-informative stimuli (e.g. non-informative
content in advertisements).42
34 See with references to further studies Hillenbrand and Schmelzer (2016), p 5.
35 Diacon and Hasseldine (2007), pp 35, 48; Jordan (2004), pp 97, 140, 165, 183, 191–192, 201.
36 Chapman and Johnson (2002), pp 120–121; Tversky and Kahneman (1974), pp 1128–1130.
37 Rabin (1998), pp 26, 29; Tor (2008), p 251.
38 See the results of the study by Jordan (2004), pp 139–140, 191, 201; cf. Huhmann and Bhattacharyya
(2005), p 309.
39 Feigenson and Park (2006), pp 144–145; Huang (2003), pp 31–34.
40 Jordan (2004), pp 87, 93, 97, 165, 192; cf. Slovic et al. (2002), p 333. For the influence of emotions on
retail investors’ investment decisions, see also generally Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) (emotions
affect demand for securities); Lucey and Dowling (2005).
41 See, e.g., Bordalo et al. (2016); Bordalo et al. (2013); Bertrand et al. (2010).
42 Slovic et al. (2002), p 337; cf. Kuhnen and Knutson (2011), p 622.
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3.2 Influence on Investment Decisions
Two empirical conditions must be fulfilled before the biases of typical retail
investors as discussed in the previous section can be used to evaluate how marketing
material by investment firms ought to be regulated. First, marketing material must
address behavioural biases and second, as a consequence, it must facilitate poor
investment decisions by investors. Regarding the first point, if a significant number
of investors are subject to systematic decision-making errors, investment firms have
incentives to exploit these mistakes in advertisements in order to increase their
sales.43 If one remembers advertising material for financial instruments before the
coming into force of MiFID I, one can easily think of material that focused on the
advantages and the past performance of a financial product in a very biased way
without mentioning the product’s risks or costs.44 Marketing communications
before MiFID I provide sufficient examples for material that exploits the five
decision-making errors described above. In relation to the second point, empirical
investigations show that advertising material for financial instruments that exploits
the five behavioural biases can distort the decision-making process of retail
investors and can lead to costly decision-making errors.45 Furthermore, empirical
research into the effects of advertising make it appear doubtful that the (initial)
influence of marketing communications on the decision-making process can be
adequately compensated by financial advice or by statutory disclosure.46
4 Devising a Behaviourally Informed Regulatory Model for MiFID II’s
Advertising Regime
Since advertising can have a distorting influence on retail investors’ investment
decisions, the EU legislature decided to regulate marketing communications in
MiFID II. This is ultimately a policy decision by the EU legislature. It is a
normative conclusion based on normative arguments, i.e. a decision balancing the
competing interests involved which is external to the behavioural sciences.47 Such a
policy decision and normative conclusion can, however, be informed by behavioural
43 Bar-Gill (2012), pp 8–17; Friedman (2011), p 577; Mullainathan et al. (2008), p 578; cf. generally
Armour et al. (2016), p 222.
44 Empirical studies for Europe seem to be missing. For similar results for the US see the studies by
Huhmann and Bhattacharyya (2005), p 304; Jones and Smythe (2003), pp 36–38.
45 In detail Jordan (2004). Cf. Bertrand et al. (2010), pp 268, 297–298; European Commission (2016),
p 335; Cronqvist (2006), pp 2–3; Huhmann and Bhattacharyya (2005), p 309. For further empirical works
showing that financial advertisements can significantly influence the decision-making process of retail
investors, see, e.g. Barber et al. (2006); Capon et al. (1996) at pp 67, 70; Cox and de Goeij (2017); Cox
and de Goeij (2018); Gallaher et al. (2008), pp 3, 30–31; Jain and Wu (2000), pp 939, 957.
46 See Kroeber-Riel and Esch (2011), pp 56–57 with references to advertising research. For discussion
see Brenncke (2013), pp 1225–1227.
47 For the distinction between behavioural empirical insights and normative arguments, see Cserne
(2015), pp 279, 289–290; Eidenmu¨ller (2011), p 814.
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research findings about investors’ bounded rationality.48 These research findings are
helpful in two ways. First, they can be used to inform the legislature’s policy
objectives and can affect the particular shape of investor protection legislation.
Second, they can be used by courts to interpret investor protection legislation, in
particular vague and ambiguous terms.
On the one hand, there is no explicit evidence showing that the authors of MiFID
II and MiFID II’s Delegated Regulation took empirical findings about investors’
heuristics and behavioural biases into account during the law-making process. The
most evidence that can be found is the European Securities and Markets Authority’s
(ESMA) statement in its technical advice preparing MiFID II’s Delegated
Regulation that insights on consumer behaviour and on the way consumers process
information should be taken into account in order to effectively design disclosure
for clients.49 On the other hand, there are no indications that the EU legislature
intended to exclude an interpretation of Article 24(3) MiFID II and Article 44
MiFID II Delegated Regulation in the light of research findings about investors’
behavioural biases. Instead, Article 24(3) MiFID II and Article 44 MiFID II
Delegated Regulation are receptive to being interpreted in the light of behavioural
finance insights about marketing communications exploiting investors’ behavioural
biases if these insights (a) are compatible with the policy objectives of both
provisions, (b) fit into MiFID II’s system of investor protection regulation and
(c) are consistent with the investor model underlying both provisions. That these
conditions are fulfilled will be demonstrated in the remainder of Sect. 4 and in
Sect. 5. Furthermore, the legal use of behavioural biases to interpret investor
protection legislation requires that they occur at a systematic level (see next
section), are theoretically plausible, are empirically tested in the context of
investment decisions and that the empirical findings are sufficiently robust.50
Article 24(3) MiFID II and Article 44 MiFID II Delegated Regulation serve two
general aims: protecting investors from individual instances of misconduct and
protecting the functioning of the financial markets.51 It is therefore necessary to
establish whether regulating advertising that exploits investors’ behavioural biases
serves to protect both aims.
4.1 Protecting the Functioning of Financial Markets
With regard to the functioning of financial markets, behavioural finance research
shows, first, that investors’ biases are persistent and systematic, do not cancel out
each other in the aggregate and therefore influence asset prices. A second pillar of
behavioural finance research is that noise trader risk is one of the limits of arbitrage,
48 Cf. generally Hacker (2015), pp 318, 322. Cf. also the discussion of whether behavioural studies can
inform the interpretation of the ‘average consumer’ standard in Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair
commercial practices: Sibony (2014), pp 909–910; Trzaskowski (2011), pp 384–385.
49 ESMA, Final report: technical advice to the Commission on MiFID II and MiFIR, 19 December 2014,
ESMA/2014/1569, p 115.
50 Similarly Klo¨hn (2009), p 449.
51 For Art. 19(2) MIFID I and Art. 27 MiFID I Implementing Directive: Thieme (2008), p 314; in detail
Brenncke (2013), pp 547–553.
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meaning that rational and well-informed investors are not always able to prevail over
boundedly rational or irrational market players. Biased investment decisions can thus
lead to a consistent mispricing of financial instruments.52 This can cause a
misallocation of capital53 and impair the allocative efficiency of the financial
markets.54 The dot-com bubble and the financial crisis of 2007–2009 provide ample
evidence for these relations. Since biased investment decisions can impair the
functioning of the financial markets, regulating advertising which exploits investors’
systematic behavioural biases aims to protect the functioning of the financial markets.
4.2 Protecting Individual Investors
Justifying the regulation of advertising with the objective of individual investor
protection is controversial if the regulation aims to protect individual investors from
themselves, for example against their own propensity to err and against their own
decision-making mistakes. That kind of regulation rings the bells of paternalism.
However, the underlying rationale for regulating advertising that addresses
investors’ behavioural biases is not that investors must be protected from their
own mistakes. It is rather based on the premise that third parties ought not to exploit
these mistakes. This is a fine but crucial distinction.55 The basis is thus protecting an
investor’s freedom of choice from distorting external influence as opposed to
helping investors to reduce or eliminate their own biases.56 MiFID II regulates
advertising in order to prevent a distorting external influence on an investor’s
investment decision. This rationale includes regulating advertisements that exploit
investors’ systematic behavioural biases.
4.3 MiFID II’s System of Investor Protection: Incorporating
a Behaviourally Informed Regulatory Model
Even though MiFID II’s new product governance regime57 may reflect experiences
and behavioural research about the limits of disclosure to secure good investor
outcomes, MiFID II’s system of investor protection is still to a large extent based on
mandatory disclosure (informational paradigm).58 That is illustrated by the increase
52 Both pillars of behavioural finance research are controversial. In detail Avgouleas (2008), pp 6–8;
Klo¨hn (2006), pp 90–135; see also Tor (2008), p 313. For growing recognition that retail investors’
behavioural biases can affect asset pricing see Storms et al. (2015), p 4; Chien et al. (2012).
53 Daniel et al. (2002), pp 173–174, 190 with references to further studies.
54 Small deviations from rationality by economic agents can make significant differences to economic
equilibria due to their cumulative effect: Akerlof (1991); Akerlof and Yellen (1985). Some scholars
consider emotional reactions by investors as a key component of asset price bubbles and market crashes;
see, e.g., Tuckett (2009).
55 Cf. generally for this distinction Sibony and Alemanno (2015), pp 17–19.
56 Legislation that attempts to help people either to reduce or to eliminate their behavioural biases falls
into the category of ‘debiasing through law’. See Jolls and Sunstein (2006). For critical discussion of this
kind of legislation see Purnhagen and Reisch (2015), pp 14–16.
57 Arts. 16(3) and 24(2) MiFID II.
58 The core provisions are Art. 24(4)-(5) MiFID II.
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of disclosure requirements under MiFID II compared to MiFID I. It would be
incompatible with MiFID II’s system of investor protection to argue that disclosure,
including disclosure in advertising, is a failed regulatory approach59 and that it
should be replaced by other behaviourally informed investor protection measures.
What is compatible with MiFID II’s system of investor protection is to recognise the
limits of disclosure and interpret vague and ambiguous terms in legislation in the
light of behavioural research60 showing that disclosed information can be made
more effective if it is simplified, standardised and better visualised. This approach
aims to increase the efficacy of disclosure.
Art 24(3) MiFID II and Article 44 MiFID II Delegated Regulation are receptive
to incorporating a regulatory model that aims to prevent advertising material from
exploiting61 investors’ behavioural biases by having in place behaviourally
informed, targeted requirements regarding the content, design and presentation of
information in advertising. This regulatory model is in harmony with libertarian
paternalism. It modifies the information environment within which investors make
decisions. It does not limit investor choice and only imposes a minimal (cost)
burden on those already acting rationally. It promotes investor autonomy by
safeguarding that the decision-making process is not distorted by external
influences.62 The model thus aims to guide and stimulate investors to a deliberative
decision-making process rather than to a specific decision-making option as
opposed to another one, which the regulator considers best for investors based on
welfare grounds.63 Therefore, the principle of an autonomous investment decision
as expressed in Article 24(5) MiFID II is not affected by this model.
5 MiFID II’s Retail Investor Model
5.1 Deviations from a Purely Rational Investor Model
Article 44(1)(d) MiFID II Delegated Regulation refers to the average member of the
group to whom a marketing communication is directed, or by whom it is likely to be
received. This indicates a normative investor model based on the ‘average investor’.64
Taking into account investors’ behavioural biases for the interpretation of MiFID II
assumes a legislative investor model that deviates from the homo oeconomicus. Even
though Article 24(5) MiFID II may be informed by the idea of a rational investor
59 For the argument that mandated disclosure is a failed regulatory attempt, see Ben-Shahar and
Schneider (2014).
60 See the findings in: Decision Technology (2010), pp 19–20, para. 29; Loewenstein et al. (2014),
pp 396, 405–410; De Goeij et al. (2014), pp 3–4. See also Oehler and Wendt (2017).
61 An intention to exploit particular biases is not necessary.
62 For general discussion see Alemanno and Sibony (2015), pp 329–333.
63 On this topic see Hausman and Welch (2010), pp 132–134; Sunstein (2013), pp 1857, 1887–1888;
Yeung (2012), pp 137–138.
64 See also European Commission, Background note to Commission draft for MiFID I Implementing
Directive, 6 February 2006, para. 7.1 (‘type of client’). For professional clients see Annex II, sentence 1
of MiFID II.
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making an informed investment decision based onmandatory disclosure, the fact is that
MiFID II’s investor protection regime does not build upon a coherent investor model.
Article 44MiFID II Delegated Regulation in particular does not correspond to the ideal
type of a rational investor. For example, Article 44(4)(b) MiFID II Delegated
Regulation prohibits advertising that contains the past performance of a financial
instrument that is less than 12 months old. This provision cannot be explained with a
rational investor model in mind. What further militates against a fully rational investor
model is that it remains a utopian ideal for a substantial part of retail investors due to
their bounded rationality. The possible objection that investor protection regulation that
is based on a behaviourally informed investor model could stabilise behavioural biases
instead of stimulating learning processes65 has only limited force for a regulatorymodel
that is built on challenging behavioural exploitation and aims to guide investors to a
deliberative decision-making process. Since MiFID II’s advertising regime deviates
from a purely rational investor model, there is a strong argument that the regulatory
model presented in this article is compatible with the investor model underlying Article
24(3) MiFID II and Article 44 MiFID II Delegated Regulation.
5.2 Investor Heterogeneity and the Model Investor
A further objection raised against incorporating behavioural insights into general
investor protection legislation is investor heterogeneity. Studies regularly show that
different investors rely on different heuristics or the same heuristics but to a different
degree when making investment decisions. Investors can show stronger or weaker
levels of behavioural biases.66 It is not doubted here that rules that permit the
tailoring of investor protection to the vulnerabilities, needs and profiles of different
groups of investors are better able to protect a diverse population of real investors
than a one-size-fits-all model.67 For example, tailor-made disclosure targeted to a
certain individual with certain behavioural biases may be a very effective disclosure
and personalised investor protection mechanism.68 Yet, that is not the approach taken
by MiFID II’s disclosure and advertising regime. MiFID II recognises a differen-
tiation of retail investors if a marketing communication is directed to or is likely to be
received by a group of investors.69 That differentiation is not, however, necessarily
determined by certain behavioural biases being prevalent in certain investor groups
due to personal or socio-economic factors. Instead, the differentiation is based on the
dissemination of the marketing communication.
What is decisive is that the legislature can protect investors who are inclined
towards the five abovementioned behavioural biases when making investment
65 For this argument see Eidenmu¨ller (2005), p 223; Erta et al. (2013), p 48. See also Tor (2008), p 321
(only limited significance of this argument).
66 For a behaviourally informed categorisation of different types of retail investors see, e.g. Bailey et al.
(2010), pp 18–21.
67 In favour of such tailored investor protection regulation: Gentile et al. (2015), p 55; Lin (2015),
pp 503–504; Mak (2012), pp 14–15.
68 For articles drawing on behavioural economics to develop a legal framework for the personalisation of
mandated disclosure, see Hacker (2017); Porat and Strahilevitz (2014).
69 Art. 44(2)(d) MiFID II Delegated Regulation.
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decisions even if other investors act rationally or do not possess these biases to the
same degree. The legislature can determine at a general level how vulnerable a
model investor is to behavioural exploitation. We will see in Sect. 6 of this article
that the prohibition to advertise with the past performance of a financial instrument
that is less than 12 months old is an example of such a policy choice. The legislature
can prescribe a normative investor model that includes assumptions about investors
being prone to behavioural exploitation and assumptions about investors possessing
certain (other) rational behaviour patterns. As long as these normative assumptions
do not conflict with each other and can be reconciled, the legislature can adopt a
‘mixed’ investor model.70 The legislature is not limited to adopting a complete
investor model based on behavioural insights that can fully replace a rational
investor model. It does not need a unitary theory that explains or predicts the full
range of investors’ behavioural biases in order to take well-documented behavioural
biases into account when making legislation.71
The next question to answer is how a regulatory authority or a court can use
empirical evidence when normatively assessing how a model retail investor is
susceptible to behavioural exploitation. Admittedly, MiFID II provides no
guidance on the difficult issue of incorporating empirical data into the
interpretation of advertising provisions. Neither does, for example, Directive
2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices even though referring to ‘the most
recent findings of behavioural economics’ is explicitly encouraged by the
European Commission when national courts and administrative authorities assess
the misleading character of a commercial practice, i.e. when they interpret the
vague notion of misleading actions in Article 6 of this directive.72 A large number
of behavioural studies about investor decision-making, employing different
methodologies, show that a significant number of retail investors across the
spectrum of low and high financially literate individuals are inclined towards the
five abovementioned behavioural biases when making investment decisions. These
robust, systematic, and predictable behavioural biases that are documented at the
population level do not reflect individual-level uniformity but rather are the
aggregation of significant individual-level heterogeneity in decision-making
behaviour.73 Yet, it is exactly this aggregation that can guide a court or a
regulatory authority when answering the legal question to what extent the average
retail investor is vulnerable to behavioural exploitation.74 In this way, the
70 That does not mean that the legislature must reflect about adopting a ‘mixed’ investor model in the
abstract. The investor model needs to be derived from the legislation as enacted and is something that
results from statutory interpretation.
71 For a different view see Posner (1998), pp 1558–1560.
72 Commission, Guidelines on the implementation/application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair
Commercial Practices, Commission Staff Working Document, 3 December 2009, SEC(2009) 1666, p 32
(available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/consumer-marketing/files/ucp_guidance_2009_en.pdf).
73 Tor (2014), p 614.
74 This typically relates to the scenario that a marketing communication is directed to or is likely to be
received by the general public, but it also applies where the marketing communications are disseminated
to a certain investor group, and robust, systematic, and predictable behavioural biases are documented for
this group.
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empirical data can be used as an indicator for the normative evaluation.75 MiFID
II’s advertising rules are general in nature; they do not mirror refined and context-
dependent behavioural research findings.76 Taking the aggregate into account is
one way to circumvent this granularity gap. It follows that the limited scope for
investor heterogeneity under MiFID II’s marketing communications regime does
not bar a behavioural finance analysis and does not bar adopting the regulatory
model presented in this article.
5.3 Financial Literacy
So far, our discussion has excluded the relationship between financial literacy and
behavioural biases. This relationship is important since a behaviourally informed
interpretation of MiFID II would hardly be possible if (a) MiFID II’s investor model
irrefutably assumes a minimum level of financial literacy and if (b) empirical
studies were to show that real investors with that level of financial literacy do not
exhibit the behavioural biases discussed in this article or are not susceptible to
behavioural exploitation.77 An abundance of empirical studies shows that financial
literacy levels are low amongst the general population.78 Since MiFID II aims to
ensure a proportionate balance between investor protection and the duties imposed
upon investment firms,79 its investor model does not adopt the known low levels of
financial literacy but incorporates irrefutable normative assumptions about a
minimum level of financial literacy that the average retail investor possesses.80
What are these normative assumptions? It is helpful to take Article 25(4) MiFID II
as the starting point since the execution-only regime applies without a suitability or
appropriateness test. Due to the limited level of investor protection, Article
25(4)(a) MiFID II only allows firms to sell a limited range of financial instruments
(non-complex financial instruments) through execution-only distribution channels.
That also means that MiFID II presupposes a minimum level of financial literacy
that enables the average retail investor to understand the structure and the risks of
75 Under Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices, the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) has recognised that empirical data can inform the average consumer model: cf. CJEU,
C-210/96, Gut Springenheide and Tusky, EU:C:1998:369, para. 35; CJEU, C-220/98, Este´e Lauder,
ECLI:EU:C:2000:8, para. 31. It is controversial whether the average consumer model of Directive
2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices must primarily be determined by an empirical or a normative
assessment. The practical differences between both conceptions in the literature are, however, small
because either an empirical investor model is adjusted by normative evaluations or a normative investor
model is informed by empirical data about consumer behaviour (Bornkamm and Feddersen (2017), § 5
UWG para. 1.102).
76 See generally Alemanno and Sibony (2015), p 340; Sibony (2014), p 933.
77 Such empirical results would inform the normative retail investor model and provide a very strong
case for the normative evaluation that MiFID II’s investor model does not take behavioural biases into
account and assumes that the average retail investor is not prone to behavioural exploitation.
78 For recent discussion see Hastings et al. (2013); Lusardi and Mitchell (2014); Stolper and Walter
(2017).
79 Recital 63 MiFID II Delegated Regulation.
80 Brenncke (2014), p 369; Buck-Heeb (2013), pp 336–337.
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non-complex financial instruments solely by consulting the information mandated
under Article 24(4), (5) MiFID II.81
To date, there is to the best of my knowledge no empirical evidence showing that
real retail investors who possess the level of financial literacy assumed by MiFID II
do not exhibit the behavioural biases discussed in this article or are not susceptible
to behavioural exploitation. The relationship between specific behavioural biases
and financial literacy must currently be considered unresolved, and some studies
point in the direction that the five behavioural biases discussed in this article do not
necessarily disappear with higher levels of financial literacy.82 It follows that
normative assumptions about the average retail investor being prone to behavioural
exploitation and possessing a certain level of financial literacy are not
irreconcilable.
If retail investors were able to guard themselves against behavioural exploitation
by learning and optimising their decision-making in the long run, a regulatory
intervention would face serious objections.83 Yet, empirical findings to date on
learning effects of retail investors in financial matters which are based on disclosure,
education, experience, feedback or training are inconclusive.84 Whether typical
decision-making heuristics and biases of retail investors can be dispelled by learning
effects is still unclear as dispelling them seems to require conditions that are
typically absent in financial market settings.85 That is why the decision for or
against the regulatory model described above should not be based on the existence
of such learning effects.
6 MiFID II’s Advertising Regime: Curbing Behavioural Exploitation
The first aim of Sect. 6 is to show how MiFID II’s specific conduct obligations for
marketing communications can be interpreted as aiming to prevent advertising
material from exploiting investors’ behavioural biases. This behavioural finance
analysis helps to explain and elucidate the purposes of these obligations, which adds
further teleological force to the regulatory model adopted here. At a policy level, the
behavioural finance analysis also adds justification for MiFID II’s advertising
81 Compared to MiFID I, MiFID II has limited the range of financial instruments which firms can sell
through execution-only distribution channels. It follows that MiFID II has reduced the level of financial
literacy that the model retail investor possesses compared to MiFID I.
82 See, e.g., Sezer and Demir (2015) (no correlation) and Ates et al. (2016) (mixed results). The latter
study also found that more experienced retail investors are significantly more likely to exhibit framing
and anchoring biases compared to investors with less investment experience. Of the studies presented in
Sect. 3 of this article, some involve individuals with low financial literacy and others with high financial
literacy.
83 Cf. Bar-Gill (2012), pp 26–31; Jolls and Sunstein (2006), pp 215, 226.
84 For discussion see Brenncke (2013), pp 1235–1239; Dimitropoulos and Hacker (2017), pp 23–25;
Fernandes et al. (2014); very critically Williams (2007), pp 244–247; Willis (2008).
85 Brenncke (2013), pp 1236–1239; Willis (2008), pp 249–250.
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modalities, some of which have been criticised as over-regulation.86 The second aim
of Sect. 6 is to use research findings from behavioural finance to evaluate the
effectiveness of MiFID II’s advertising regime to protect retail investors from
behavioural exploitation. Behaviourally informed policy proposals will be presented
that aim to better safeguard this objective.
So far, there have been no empirical studies examining how effective the
advertising provisions in Article 24(3) MiFID II and Article 44 MiFID II Delegated
Regulation (or its predecessor provisions in MiFID I and MiFID I Implementing
Directive) are to curb behavioural exploitation. This is surprising as empirical
studies about investor behaviour, carried out on behalf of the European Commis-
sion, informed the design of the key investor information document for UCITS and
for packaged retail investment and insurance based investment products (PRIIPs).87
Such empirical studies are important for investor regulation that is informed by
behavioural finance because, firstly, regulators are also susceptible to decision-
making errors, and secondly, we cannot (yet) determine ex-ante at a theoretical level
and with sufficient exactitude whether certain modalities for advertising will
actually prevent marketing communications from exploiting investors’ decision-
making errors.88 Identifying the drivers of behavioural change is critical for the
design of effective interventions. Good lawmaking standards in the area of investor
protection should require that new regulatory measures must at least be tested on a
limited scale before they become law.89 Empirical investigations should be used to
(a) observe the consequences of possible interventions and (b) identify appropriate
regulatory measures to ensure that the future marketing communications regime
effectively protects investors and does not unnecessarily burden investment firms.90
The policy proposals presented in this article aim to offer a starting point for such
studies or experiments.
6.1 Comprehensibility Requirement
Article 44(1)(d) MiFID II Delegated Regulation enshrines the comprehensibility
requirement. The provision requires that information addressed to (potential) retail
or professional clients must be presented in a way that it is likely to be understood
by, the average member of the group to whom it is directed, or by whom it is likely
86 For this criticism, see Zeidler (2008), p 244.
87 IFF Research and YouGov (2009); Decision Technology (2010); European Commission, Consumer
testing study of the possible new format and content for retail disclosures of packaged retail and
insurance-based investment products, final report, November 2015.
88 Alemanno and Sibony (2015), pp 338–340 list five major difficulties that arise in relation to legal use
of behavioural insights: (a) the questionable external validity of laboratory experiments, (b) the temporal
dimension of influencing mechanisms as the effectiveness of these mechanisms may decrease over time,
(c) heterogeneity in the population, (d) a selective understanding of behavioural insights by policymakers
and (e) the necessary general nature of legislation as opposed to detailed and context-dependent
behavioural studies.
89 In favour of using randomised controlled trials (RCTs) to try behaviourally informed policies before
implementing them: Ulen (2013), p 1374.
90 On the diversity of methodologies for empirical studies see Engel (2014), pp 128–137; Loewenstein
et al. (2014), pp 398–399.
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to be received. We have seen in Sect. 5 that MiFID II’s investor model does not
adopt the low level of financial literacy seen among real retail investors.91 MiFID
II’s model retail investor is presumed to be able to understand non-complex
financial instruments based on information mandated under Article 24(4), (5)
MiFID II.
In the light of the average retail investor being susceptible to behavioural
exploitation, the comprehensibility requirement also aims to prevent that advertising
material exploits investors’ framing bias and availability bias, in particular the
salience bias. This amplification of the provision’s purpose is best illustrated with
regard to risk information provided in marketing communications. Whether the risks
of a financial instrument are presented as theoretical and abstract or as real has a
considerable impact on how they are perceived and understood by retail investors.
The comprehensibility requirement amplifies the clarity criterion in Article 24(3)
MiFID II. The latter requires that information must be provided in such a way that
its significance and intent can be easily understood by the average investor.92 The
representation (framing) of the risks of the financial instrument in marketing
communications must thus be suitable to give the average investor a realistic and
accurate impression of the significance of risk information and about the scope of
the risks. This implies that information about risks is sufficiently embedded in the
context of other information about the financial instrument provided in the
advertisement. A realistic and accurate impression of the risks and their scope
entails that an average investor can correctly weigh the risks and correctly estimate
the probability of their occurrence. Future empirical studies should determine which
representation modes are (un)suitable for effectively enabling a typical retail
investor to understand the significance and extent of the risks of a financial
instrument and to correctly assess the likelihood that the risks will materialise.93
The regulator could then use these research findings when providing examples of
good/bad practices in marketing communications.94 Unsuitable presentation meth-
ods in marketing communications indicate an infringement of the comprehensibility
requirement. For example, the comprehensibility requirement is infringed if
(a) information about the risks of a financial instrument is presented in such a
way that it makes an average retail investor believe that the risks are merely abstract
91 Cf. the discussion of the rather disenchanting empirical results of European Commission, Consumer
testing study of the possible new format and content for retail disclosures of packaged retail and
insurance-based investment products, final report, November 2015 regarding retail investors’ low level of
financial literacy in Colaert (2016), pp 218–219.
92 Cf. Commission recommendation of 25 July 1977 concerning a European code of conduct relating to
transactions in transferable securities, Annex, General principles, 2 [1977] OJ L212/37.
93 Ideally, the European Commission would initiate such retail investor testing studies in relation to the
presentation of risk information in the form of field experiments with a representative sample of European
retail investors.
94 ESMA has adopted the practice of providing examples of good/bad practices in marketing
communications addressed to retail investors that would/would not meet the requirement to present
information to clients in a manner that is fair, clear and not misleading (Art. 19(2) MiFID I, now Art.
24(3) MiFID II). See ESMA, Q & A relating to the provision of CFDs and other speculative products to
retail investors under MiFID, 25 July 2016, ESMA/2016/1165, section 3, Question 1 para. 2, Question 2
para. 20.
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and theoretical or if (b) the presentation of other information or non-informative
content in an advertisement distracts an average investor from correctly perceiving
the financial instrument’s risks.
Future empirical research should also determine in what way information about
risk can be presented in advertisements in order to align a financial instrument’s
perceived and actual risk level and in order to safeguard that a typical retail investor
does not overweight the benefits and underweight the risks of a financial instrument,
without at the same time leading to an overshooting.95 What should be examined is
a presentation format that incorporates knowledge about framing effects and loss
aversion96 in such a way that risks are described as a (possible) loss of assets of an
individual investor.97 Potential losses should be presented in terms of absolute
amounts of money as opposed to a percentage or frequency.98 A simplified
presentation of the risks of a financial instrument on the basis of a risk scale that
shows risks aggregated together may also be explored for marketing communica-
tions relating to a specific financial instrument. Such a simple risk scale is required
for the key investor information document for UCITS and the key information
document for PRIIPs.99 Other forms of graphical risk indicators should also be
considered as they have been shown to align a mutual fund’s perceived and actual
risk level and, thus, improved investment decisions for the (student) participants of
the study substantially as well as reduced the participants’ reliance on heuristics.100
Even more simplistic is the proposal to introduce an easy-to-understand traffic light
label for financial instruments.101 Such a traffic light labelling would take advantage
of existing heuristics of retail investors.
Even though empirical research may establish that the proposals discussed in this
paragraph can be regarded as good practices for presenting risk information in
advertisements, it seems unlikely that one specific graphical risk indicator will be
positively required under the comprehensibility test.102 That is because it seems
likely that a variety of graphical risk indicators can ensure that an average retail
investor can easily understand the significance and extent of the risks of a financial
instrument.
95 Overshooting relates to the risk that modifying the choice architecture with legal norms that aim to
counteract behavioural biases can produce biases and errors of its own. See Jolls and Sunstein (2006),
pp 230–231. Langevoort (1996), p 694 addresses the risk of overshooting for a very salient presentation of
risks in information documents.
96 For an explanation of loss aversion see Pompian (2012), pp 191–197.
97 For proposals for an effective presentation of risk information see Gentile et al. (2015); Klo¨hn (2006),
pp 190–192.
98 Oehler and Wendt (2017).
99 Art. 8 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 583/2010 [2010] OJ L176/1-15; Art. 8(3)(d) Regulation (EU)
No. 1286/2014 [2014] OJ L352/1-23.
100 De Goeij et al. (2014), pp 6, 22, 32–33.
101 HM Treasury, Reforming financial markets, July 2009, para. 8.27, available at https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/reforming-financial-markets.
102 On the difficulties of developing visual risk indicators that give a truthful reflection of the risk and
return of a financial product see Colaert (2016), pp 217–221.
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6.2 Obligation to Provide Sufficient Information in Marketing
Communications
Article 44(2)(d) MiFID II Delegated Regulation enshrines the requirement that a
marketing communication must be ‘sufficient’ for the average member of the group
to whom it is directed. What the provision does not expressly clarify is what the
marketing communication must be sufficient for. This obligation has been
interpreted as requiring that advertising material that relates to a specific financial
instrument must at least contain the essential characteristics of the financial
instrument, including its risks.103 Since MiFID II considers cost disclosure, together
with risk disclosure, as a key element to enhance the ability of investors to assess the
products that are offered to them,104 the total costs also form part of these essential
characteristics. This compulsory disclosure of information about the risks and costs
of a financial instrument in advertisements aims to challenge behavioural
exploitation by encouraging a deliberative decision-making process. It (a) aims to
ensure, for example, that investors do not ignore these criteria or underweight them
in relation to information about historical performance in advertisements, and (b),
thus, aims to counteract a decision-making process that is solely or too strongly
influenced by the representativeness bias. An investment firm infringes its
obligation to provide sufficient information in marketing communications if the
advertising material exclusively displays the financial instrument’s historical
performance.
Nevertheless, it appears unclear whether the obligation to provide sufficient
information in marketing communications in its current shape can guarantee that
retail investors weigh the risks and the costs of their investment adequately in
relation to past performance data when making an investment decision. For
example, the participants of a US-based study were presented with advertising
material which contained the costs and the historical performance of a mutual fund.
They were significantly influenced by the past performance data instead of by the
costs even when the advertisement contained highly salient information on fund
costs.105 This is surprising because the costs are an easily predictable and
stable factor for assessing the investment’s future performance. However, another
US-based study found that information processing improved for investors with low
financial knowledge when advertising material contained information about the
costs and risks of the investment product.106 The result of this study suggests that
displaying such information is capable of minimising the exploitation of decision-
making errors by advertising material.107 This is in line with the finding of a Dutch
study among relatively high financially literate retail investors that salient risk
103 For Art. 27(2) subpara. 3 MiFID I Implementing Directive see Brenncke (2013), p 735; cf. CESR,
CESR’s technical advice on possible implementing measures of the Directive 2004/39/EC on Markets in
Financial Instruments, CESR/05-024c, January 2005, p 45.
104 Art. 24(4)(c) and subpara. 2 MiFID II.
105 Pontari et al. (2009), pp 340–341, 346–348.
106 Lee et al. (2012).
107 Cf. Lee et al. (2012), pp 283–284.
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disclosure in advertisements does increase investors’ knowledge regarding the risks
of the investment.108 Despite the vagueness of the term ‘sufficient’, it would,
however, be straining the language of Article 44(2)(d) MiFID II Delegated
Regulation too far to require that the essential characteristics of a financial
instrument must be presented in a salient manner in order to fulfil this condition.
Article 44(2)(d) MiFID II Delegated Regulation also includes a restrictive stance
against advertisements for specific financial instruments that contain predominantly
persuasive non-informative content. The provision intends to prevent advertise-
ments from creating a stimuli that lets investors base their decision-making
predominantly on emotions without a sufficiently cognitive engagement with the
essential elements of the financial instrument. The regulator can, informed by
behavioural studies, determine when addressing investors’ emotions in advertise-
ments exploits emotional biases in a typical retail investor and leads to poor
investment decisions. In other words, a regulatory authority can use behavioural
insights to determine where the normative border between lawful and unlawful
emotional influence on an investor’s decision-making process lies.109 The vague
term ‘sufficient’ allows for this determination. Restricting investment firms from
exploiting investors’ emotions in financial advertisements is also justified by the
assessment inherent in Article 24(5) MiFID II that an informed investment decision
ought to be taken primarily based on mandatory disclosure.
If the focus is drawn to improving the effectiveness of the current regime, future
research should shed more light on the effectiveness of presenting the total costs and
the essential risks (or a risk indicator) of the financial instrument being advertised in
a salient and standardised way, which also appears in a different form than the rest
of the advertising content. Providing information in a standardised format facilitates
comparisons and thus increases the effectiveness of information provided to
investors, though there is limited empirical evidence in this area.110 To the extent
that the standardisation aims to achieve a comparability of advertising material, this
objective is alien to the existing obligation, but not to MiFID II’s advertising regime
in general because a standardisation objective is inbuilt in MiFID II’s specific
requirements for the presentation of performance data. The Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in the US, for example, requires in its rule 2210
(d)(5), that an investment firm’s print advertisement addressed to retail investors
that presents mutual fund performance must contain information about the fund’s
cost in a prominent text box. What should be kept in mind is the issue of information
overload as salient disclosure of fundamental product information might be
ineffective if it leads advertisements to become longer. Therefore, research findings
on ‘visual nudges’ should be taken into account that show that graphical information
representations regarding mutual funds’ risks (like a standardised overall risk
108 Cox and de Goeij (2018), p 19.
109 This is not an easy determination since (a) emotions and cognitions always work together when
investors take investment decisions and (b) informative content in advertisements regularly addresses
investors’ cognitions as well as emotions; cf. Huang (2003), p 45. Principally, addressing investors’
emotions through advertisements is permitted in the area of financial investments as well as in other areas
of life; see Brenncke (2013), pp 857–861; generally McCrudden and King (2016), p 116.
110 See Loewenstein et al. (2014), pp 406–408 for discussion.
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indicator) and expected return net of fees substantially improved investment
decisions of the (student) participants of the study and reduced their reliance on
heuristics.111
Furthermore, research indicates that a significant number of mutual fund
investors underweight the costs of a financial product when making an investment
decision,112 which has been attributed to investors exhibiting behavioural biases.113
Hence, a salient notice should be developed and tested that helps investors
understand the impact of costs on their returns, for example that the costs are, apart
from the asset allocation, in the long run the most important factor for the net return
of a diversified portfolio. In compliance with the regulatory model presented above
the purpose of such a notice would not primarily be to increase investors’ financial
literacy, but to safeguard that advertising presenting the benefits of a financial
instrument and past performance data does not exploit investors’ behavioural biases.
6.3 Equivalence Rule When Presenting Benefits and Risks
A further requirement for marketing communications stipulates that they must
always give a fair and prominent indication of any relevant risks when referencing
any potential benefits of a financial instrument (Article 44(2)(b) MiFID II Delegated
Regulation). This requirement does not oblige investment firms to present the risks
of a financial instrument in a more prominent manner than the benefits. According
to ESMA, the provision is intended to provide a ‘balanced presentation of the trade-
off between risks and benefits’.114 Like its predecessor in MiFID I,115 the provision
enshrines an equivalence rule116: If advertising mentions the benefits of a financial
instrument, it must also refer to the risks in an equivalent manner. Without the
equivalence rule, benefits could be presented in a prominent and vivid manner,
whereas risks could be presented in an abstract and complex manner. That creates
the danger that investors do not adequately appreciate, i.e. underweight, the risks of
a financial instrument and underestimate the probability of their occurrence when
making an investment decision. The equivalence rule therefore aims to minimise the
risk that advertising material by investment firms exploits an investor’s framing
bias, availability bias and salience bias. The obligation also intends to counteract
that advertising material exploits the anchoring bias by prohibiting investment firms
from highlighting information about expected returns as a benefit of a financial
instrument in the marketing communication without displaying the instrument’s
risks in an equivalent way.
Another MiFID II addition is the requirement that information must use a font
size in the indication of relevant risks that is at least equal to the predominant font
111 De Goeij et al. (2014), pp 6, 22, 32–33.
112 Bailey et al. (2010), p 26; Choi et al. (2010); Pontari et al. (2009).
113 Bailey et al. (2010), p 26.
114 ESMA, Consultation paper: MiFID II/MiFIR, 22 May 2014, ESMA/2014/549, p 92.
115 Art. 27(2) subpara. 2 MiFID I Implementing Directive.
116 For MiFID I: German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), Rundschreiben 4/2010,
MaComp, last updated on 8 March 2017, para. BT.3.3.3.
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size used throughout the information provided, as well as a layout ensuring such
indication is prominent (Article 44(2)(c) MiFID II Delegated Regulation). That
requirement is best read in connection with the equivalence rule enshrined in Article
44(2)(b) MiFID II Delegated Regulation.117 The reference to the layout in the
provision clarifies that the equivalence rule also applies to the layout of risk
presentation. The reference to the font size surprises at first sight as the provision
does not require a font size that is equivalent to the font size used for the indication
of the benefits of a financial instrument. That does not mean, however, that the risks
can be presented in a smaller font size than the benefits if the latter are shown in an
unusually large font size. The meaning of Article 44(2)(c) MiFID II Delegated
Regulation can rather be explained as follows: if a marketing communication
contains a considerable amount of information other than information relating to the
benefits of a financial instrument, e.g. non-informative content appealing to an
investor’s emotions, that is shown in a large font size like 16 pt and if the benefits
are shown in a standard font size like 11 pt, then the information about risks must be
shown at least in 16 pt. That interpretation illustrates two points. First, the provision
aims to minimise the risk that advertising material exploits investors’ availability,
salience and framing biases. Second, Article 44(2)(c) MiFID II Delegated
Regulation also aims to ensure that investors’ emotional bias is not exploited by
marketing communications and that an investment decision is adequately informed
by the characteristics of a financial instrument rather than emotional stimuli.
What should be empirically tested is whether the equivalence rule in its current
form is an effective mechanism that can safeguard that retail investors do not
overweight the benefits and underweight the risks of a financial instrument. Other
possible mechanisms to present risk information in advertisements were already
discussed in this article under the comprehensibility requirement.
6.4 Presentation of Past Performance
Article 44(4) MiFID II Delegated Regulation contains detailed requirements for
marketing communications that contain an indication of past performance of a
financial instrument. In particular, an indication of past performance must not be the
most prominent feature of the communication (Article 44(4)(a) MiFID II Delegated
Regulation). This provision aims to prevent, firstly, that advertising material
exploits the availability bias and, secondly, that investors use past performance data
as an anchor for future performance (anchoring bias). Furthermore, Article
44(4)(d) MiFID II Delegated Regulation requires that marketing communications
contain a prominent warning that the figures refer to the past and that past
performance is not a reliable indicator of future results. The warning is intended to
counteract a decision-making by investors that is affected by the representativeness
bias. The requirement that the warning must be prominent makes use of the
availability heuristic (in particular salience) and framing effects. Based on this
analysis, a warning is prominent if its presentation in the marketing communication
117 To that effect see also ESMA, Consultation paper: MiFID II/MiFIR, 22 May 2014, ESMA/2014/549,
p 92, para. 11, fn. 53.
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is emphasised compared to the past performance figures. The salient risk warning
demanded by Article 44(4)(d) MiFID II Delegated Regulation also shows that
MiFID II’s advertising regime is not opposed to118 regulatory measures that also
target system 1 of decision-making, distinctly associated with behavioural biases,
which is fast, automatic and intuitive as opposed to system 2, which is slow,
calculative and deliberative.119 The salience of the warning is supposed to attract an
investor’s attention and activate system 2’s deliberative decision processes.
The warning in Article 44(4)(d) MiFID II Delegated Regulation contains the
statement that past performance data is an indicator for future performance, just not
a reliable one. Against the background of the very low predictive validity of
historical performance data for future performance, this wording of the warning
appears too sugarcoated. Moreover, the warning is rather abstract and unspecific, i.e.
not salient, which diminishes its effect. Mercer, Palmiter and Taha show in a US
study that the warning ‘past performance does not guarantee future results’ does not
discourage retail investors from relying heavily on the past performance of an
investment fund when making an investment decision.120 A warning that was
formulated in significantly stronger language121 was, however, almost capable of
eliminating the influence of historical performance data presented in advertising on
the decision-making process of retail investors.122 This empirical evidence suggests
that Article 44(4)(d) MiFID II Delegated Regulation does not provide an adequate
level of investor protection and should be replaced by a different warning.
Two further conditions in Article 44(4)(b) MiFID II Delegated Regulation are
also intended to prevent advertising material from exploiting investors’ availability
and representativeness biases: (a) the requirement that performance information
must principally cover the preceding 5 years and (b) the requirement that this
information must be based on complete 12-month periods. These two conditions
aim to prohibit marketing communications that selectively present the time horizon
for past returns in order to distract investor attention from fluctuations in value or
reversals in trend and in order to trigger unjustified positive trend impressions. Since
retail investors often place too much emphasis on a high short-term past
performance of a financial instrument, those two requirements in particular
counteract the recency bias and sample size neglect (overestimation of the reliability
of a small sample size). Furthermore, both requirements can be interpreted as an
118 Regulatory measures that appeal to or activate system 1 like graphic warnings are opposed by some
scholars on grounds of manipulation and an infringement of individual autonomy; for discussion see
Baldwin (2014), pp 844–852; Hacker (2016), pp 13–22; Alemanno and Sibony (2015), pp 329–333.
119 Kahneman (2011), pp 20–21. See Evans and Stanovich (2013) for a review of the criticisms and a
defence of a dual process theory of human information processing.
120 Mercer et al. (2010), pp 449–453. Hu¨sser and Wirth (2013), p 238 argue that the warning ‘past
performance is not indicative of future results’ is ineffective when consumer investors have limited
attention and lower processing abilities.
121 ‘Do not expect the fund’s quoted past performance to continue in the future. Studies show that mutual
funds that have outperformed their peers in the past generally do not outperform them in the future.
Strong past performance is often a matter of chance.’.
122 Mercer et al. (2010), pp 453, 457.
The Legal Framework for Financial Advertising: Curbing…
123
instrument against an exploitation of the anchor bias because investment firms
cannot use a selectively chosen past performance period as an anchor.
6.5 Clear Identifiability of Marketing Communications
Marketing communications must be clearly identifiable as such.123 This requirement
is informed by the idea that an average investor knows that marketing communi-
cations do not contain unbiased information. The average investor shall have a
reserved and critical approach towards a marketing communication that is clearly
identifiable as such. It is possible to conceptualise this requirement as an attempt to
induce a heuristic by legislation, aimed at reducing the distorting impact of
advertising material on the decision-making process. If Article 24(3) sentence 2
MiFID II is seen as such an attempt, its effect can be strengthened by requiring a
prominent labelling—instead of only a clear identifiability—of marketing commu-
nications. The provision’s wording is open for such a strict interpretation, but
empirical testing should confirm whether this labelling would actually have the
desired effect.
6.6 Compatibility with ESMA’s Supervisory Approach
To date, ESMA has not released guidelines or recommendations under Article 16 of
the ESMA Regulation,124 opinions under Article 29(1)(a) of the ESMA Regulation
or Q&As under Article 29(2) of the ESMA Regulation that specifically interpret
Article 24(3) MiFID II and Article 44 MiFID II Delegated Regulation in order to
ensure a common and uniform interpretation of these provisions throughout the EU
and in order to promote supervisory convergence. Neither has ESMA published
guidelines or recommendations on the interpretation of Article 19(2) MiFID I and
Article 27 MiFID I Implementing Directive. There is also no case law by the Court
of Justice of the European Union interpreting these two provisions. Opinions and
Q&As were provided by ESMA on the interpretation of the latter two provisions in
relation to marketing communications addressed to retail investors for complex
products as well as for financial contracts for difference and other similarly
speculative products.125 These supervisory tools address the particularities associ-
ated with these financial instruments. They are silent about how at a meta-level the
advertising provisions aim to challenge behavioural exploitation. In other areas of
investor protection regulation under MiFID I and II, ESMA has rarely explicitly
123 Art. 24(3) sentence 2 MiFID II.
124 Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010
establishingaEuropeanSupervisoryAuthority (EuropeanSecurities andMarketsAuthority), amendingDecision
No. 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC [2010] OJ L331/84.
125 ESMA, Opinion: MiFID practices for firms selling complex products, ESMA/2014/146, 7 February
2014, paras. 23–30; ESMA, Q & A relating to the provision of CFDs and other speculative products to
retail investors under MiFID, ESMA/2016/1165, 25 July 2016, section 3.
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referred to a behaviourally informed interpretation,126 but has to this day not ruled
out such an approach. Most recently, ESMA has provided draft guidelines to firms
on how to take into account behavioural finance research findings about investors’
behavioural biases when designing the questionnaire to collect clients’ information
for the purpose of the suitability assessment in Article 25(2) MiFID II.127 The
interpretation given to MiFID II’s advertising requirements in Sect. 6 is thus
compatible with ESMA’s supervisory approach. That means that ESMA and
national competent authorities can adopt the interpretative approach and the
regulatory model provided in this article.
7 Conclusion
This article argued that it is necessary to analyse MiFID II’s advertising regime
from a behavioural finance perspective. It demonstrated how specific advertising
requirements in Article 44 MiFID II Delegated Regulation can be interpreted in the
light of behavioural finance research findings about financial advertisements
exploiting retail investors’ typical behavioural biases. The article submitted that
Article 24(3) MiFID II and Article 44 MiFID II Delegated Regulation are receptive
to incorporating a model that aims to prevent advertising material from exploiting
investors’ behavioural biases by having in place behaviourally informed, targeted
requirements regarding the content, design and presentation of information in
advertising. The article then explained that this interpretation is in harmony with the
policy objectives of both provisions, fits into MiFID II’s system of investor
protection regulation, is consistent with the investor model underlying both
provisions and is compatible with ESMA’s supervisory approach. The behavioural
finance analysis helped to elucidate the purposes of MiFID II’s advertising
provisions. The article further demonstrated how a regulatory authority or a court
can translate empirical research findings about behavioural exploitation into legal
arguments when assessing whether marketing practices can significantly distort a
model investor’s decision-making process. Finally, the article presented behaviou-
rally informed policy proposals that aim to protect investors more effectively from
behavioural exploitation. These proposals should be tested empirically.
The results of this article are not limited to the regulation of marketing
communications under MiFID II, but merit further research in other fields of
investor protection. MiFID II’s new product governance regime, for example, is a
move away from the informational paradigm and the rational investor model
towards a more paternalistic protection of the vulnerable consumer of financial
instruments.128 The results of this article warrant the question whether an
126 For an exception see ESMA, Opinion: Structured Retail Products—Good practices for product
governance arrangements, ESMA/2014/332, 27 March 2014, para. 25 (‘An understanding of the target
market is particularly relevant for the following reasons: […] c. avoiding any form of exploitation of
investor behavioural biases’.).
127 ESMA, Consultation paper: Guidelines on certain aspects of the MiFID II suitability requirements, 13
July 2017, ESMA35-43-748, pp 9–12.
128 Cherednychenko (2014), pp 400–401.
The Legal Framework for Financial Advertising: Curbing…
123
investment firm that designs a financial instrument must identify and consider
typical behavioural biases of end clients when determining the instrument’s target
market.129 In the realm of investment advice and MiFID II’s suitability
assessment,130 the question arises whether a financial adviser must obtain
information regarding a client’s behavioural biases and take into account these
biases when assessing the suitability of a financial instrument for the client.
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